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Protecting Speech, Protecting Privacy:  
The Future Costs of U.K. Libel Claims 
 
ADELAIDE SCARDINO LOPEZ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In January 2011, writers and publishers around the world—big and 
small, for- and not-for-profit—heaved a sigh of relief. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had held that the attorney’s fees levied 
against the Mirror Group Newspapers (MGN) in a privacy suit1 by 
fashion model Naomi Campbell before the Queen’s Bench in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) infringed the newspaper’s right to free speech.2  
At issue in the Campbell case before the ECtHR were the “success 
fees”3 awarded to Naomi Campbell’s lawyers for winning the case, in 
addition to payment of their contingency fees and the cost of the 
settlement.4 The U.K. court had awarded Ms. Campbell £3500 in 
damages, and over £1m in attorneys’ fees and costs;5 a fee award the 
ECtHR held to be “disproportionate” to the damages levied. 6  
Given the U.K.’s position as the preeminent destination for forum-
shopping libel claimants, this decision by the ECtHR was significant for 
publishers, journalists, bloggers, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) both in the U.K., and around the world.  
A.  Political Reaction 
Following the ECtHR’s ruling, the British Parliament announced it 
would consider reforming its contingency fee structure as part of “wider 
government efforts to help businesses and public bodies fearful of 
 
*  J.D., Loyola Law School, 2012. B.A., Columbia College, Columbia University 2000. The 
author would like to thank Professor Karl Manheim for his guidance and direction in pursuing 
this article, and the dedicated staff of Loyola’s International and Comparative Law Review for 
their tireless efforts and helpful feedback during the editing process.  
 1. Unlike in the United States, in the U.K. there is no “invasion of privacy” tort. Campbell 
v. MGN, [2004] UKHL 22, ¶ 11. Claims like that of Ms. Campbell, for publishing a story about 
her attending a Narcotics Anonymous meeting, are brought as claims for breach of confidence, as 
in Campbell, as well as defamation, as discussed here.  
 2. MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 219 (2011).  
 3. Infra Part III(A).  
 4. MGN, supra note 2, ¶ 198.  
 5. Campbell v. MGN, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3394 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 6. MGN, supra note 2, ¶ 219.  
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costly litigation.”7 Subsequently, the House of Commons and the House 
of Lords passed an act that would restrict both the conditional fee 
agreements8 at the heart of the Campbell case, and after-the-event 
(ATE) insurance,9 another contributor to the grotesque legal fees 
associated with U.K. privacy claims. Clause 46 of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (LASPO) altogether 
eliminates the use of ATE insurance in privacy claims,10 while clause 44 
drastically restricts (although falls short of eliminating) the use of 
success fees by limiting any such fees to a percentage of the damages 
award itself.11 
B.  Public Reaction 
A group of dissenters, ranging from the Law Society12 to Kate and 
Gerry McCann,13 have publicly challenged LASPO, claiming that it 
limits access to the courts for lower income litigants engaged in privacy 
disputes.14   
While these dissenters agree costs in libel and other privacy cases 
are often too high, they believe the solution proposed in LASPO will 
harm the most vulnerable. Dissenters argue that both claimants who 
lack the means to bring a claim, and respondents who, even if 
successful, would not have enough in damages available to cover their 
 
 7. Josh Halliday, European Court Deals Blow to No Win, No Fee Deals in Naomi 
Campbell Case, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 18, 2011), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jan/18/european-court-of-human-rights-daily-mirror-
naomi-campbell.  
 8.  Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012, c. 10, § 44  (Eng.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/10/pdfs/ukpga_20120010_en.pdf 
[hereinafter Legal Aid].  
 9. Id. § 46.  
 10. Id. § 46(1).  
 11. Id. § 44(2).  
 12. The Law Society of England and Wales is the organization dedicated to representing and 
advising British solicitors. See THE LAW SOCIETY, http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/home.law (last 
visited May 1, 2012). See also, The End of the World As We Know It, THE LAW SOCIETY, 
http://www.lawsociety.org/uk/advice/articles/the-end-of-the-world-as-we-know-it/ (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2013).  
 13. The McCann’s have attracted the tabloid spotlight as a result of their five-year search for 
their daughter Madeleine who disappeared from their hotel room during a vacation to Portugal. 
They were thrust back into the spotlight in July of 2011 when it was revealed that they too had 
been victims of phone hacking by tabloid journalists. Richard Allen Greene, Madeleine 
McCann’s Mother Says She Felt Violated by Murdoch Paper, CNN (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-11-23/world/world_europe_uk-phone-hacking-scandal_1_milly-
dowler-voice-mail-british-girl?_s=PM:EUROPE.  
 14. Owen Bowcott, Kate and Gerry McCann Urge PM to Save ‘No Win, No Fee’ for Libel 
Cases, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/26/mccanns-
cameron-media-libel-legal-aid?intcmp=239. See also Gerry and Kate McCann, Dear David 
Cameron: Full Text of the Open Letter on Legal Aid Bill, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/26/mccann-open-letter-david-cameron.  
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defense costs, would be prevented from pursuing justice.15 These 
potential victims include, for example, the middle class families whose 
personal tragedies made them the targets of News Corp’s insidious 
phone hacking practices; as well as the bloggers, small papers, and 
NGOs, whose intervention in the Campbell Case16 was so influential in 
the ECtHR’s decision. 
C.  Thesis 
This article focuses on the impact LASPO’s revised fee structure 
will have in the context of libel claims in particular, and argues that 
speech would be better protected by additionally adopting California’s 
Anti-SLAPP model. LASPO falls short of meeting the goal set by the 
ECtHR to create a fee structure that is “necessary in a democratic 
society,”17 such that free speech, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), will remain safe. 
Rather, LASPO still allows the threat of a potentially crushing fee 
structure to chill speech across the U.K., and abroad. In contrast, 
California’s Anti-SLAPP law, protects free speech by providing 
defendants an early opportunity to make a basic and preliminary 
showing that the defamation claim is bogus before committing to costly 
litigation; while also protecting privacy by allowing the plaintiff to 
retain the opportunity to prove that the claim was in fact well-founded, 
thus keeping the doors of justice open to her.  
Part I lays out the policies behind balancing privacy rights and 
rights of free speech, both in the United States and in the U.K., as well 
as discusses the role of libel tourism in forcing an alignment of these 
goals.  
Part II explains what is traditionally known as the “English Rule” 
of contingent fee agreements (CFAs), and how it has functioned to date, 
including the role of success fees and ATE insurance; as well as 
analyzes the costs and benefits of those provisions.   
Part III similarly looks at the “American Rule” regarding fee-
shifting, and specifically analyzes the benefits of Anti-SLAPP laws, 
which, on a state-by-state basis, are the closest the United States has 
come to consistently providing fee-shifting measures in defamation 
suits. 
Part IV proposes potential solutions to achieve the sought-for 
balance between the right of expression and the right of privacy—
 
 15. Id.  
 16. James Goldson, Peter Noorlander & Mark Stephens, Written Comments in the Case of 
MGN v. United Kingdom, OPEN SOCIETY OF JUSTICE INITIATIVE (2009), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/written-comments-20090313.pdf 
[hereinafter Intervenors’ Comments].  
 17. See MGN, supra note 2, ¶ 198.  
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culminating in Part V with the conclusion that LASPO fails to achieve 
these goals, and California’s Anti-SLAPP model would help better 
realize them. 
II.  DEFAMATION POLICY: A TRANS-ATLANTIC MATTER 
A.  Shared Policies 
In a 2010 article in the Journal of International Media and 
Entertainment Law, James Windon neatly listed the five main goals of 
the U.S. libel system:  
1) Discouraging plaintiffs from filing non-meritorious lawsuits; 
2) Encouraging potential plaintiffs with small claims to file lawsuits; 
3) Encouraging plaintiffs to settle litigation prior to trial; 
4) Encouraging all reporting and public comment by media outlets that 
is less than actionable defamation; and 
5) Discouraging all reporting that amounts to actionable defamation.
18
 
These five goals create a checklist for whatever substantive or 
procedural law might be proposed in response to the Campbell case and 
reflect the balance that courts and scholars have expressed as the goals 
not just for U.S. defamation law, but also for U.K. defamation law.19  
In fact, these goals accurately reflect the very balance performed 
by the ECtHR when weighing the rights enunciated in Articles 8 and 10 
of the ECHR: 
Article 8:  
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.
20
 
. . . .  
Article 10: 
 (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. . . . 
 
 18. See generally James Windon, Fee Shifting in Libel Litigation: How the American 
Approach to Costs Allocation Inhibits the Achievement of Libel Law’s Substantive Goals, 3 J. 
INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 175 (2010).  
 19. See, e.g., A Comparative Study of Costs in Defamation Proceedings Across Europe, U. 
OF OXFORD PROGRAMME IN COMP. MEDIA L. & POL'Y CENTER FOR SOCIO-LEGAL STUD. 182–
83 (Dec. 2008), available at 
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/defamationreport.pdf. (“It cannot 
be legitimate or proportionate to widen access to justice to some at the expense of restricting or 
denying it to others.” [hereinafter Oxford Comparative Study] (quoting ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1061 (2d ed. 2006)).  
 20.  Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 
C.E.T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter ECHR] (original formatting omitted) (emphasis added).  
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(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
 restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary  
 in a democratic society . . .  for the protection of the reputation or 
 the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
 received in confidence.
21
 
When the ECtHR determines whether or not an action potentially 
violates Article 10, here, in pursuit of upholding Article 8, it does so by 
considering three standards: (1) whether the potential violation was “in 
accordance with law” or “prescribed by law”; (2) whether or not the 
potential violation pursues any legitimate aims as laid out in Article 
10(2); and, (3) whether or not the potential violation is “necessary in a 
democratic society.”22 The ECtHR spends the most time analyzing the 
third factor, defining “necessary” as “proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.”23 Thus, the balancing conducted in the ECtHR most 
substantially occurs in determining whether or not the alleged limitation 
of expression is “proportionate” to a particular action to protect privacy.  
B.  Libel Tourism24 
Beyond the shared judicial goals for defamation law, the fate of the 
U.S. and the U.K. approaches are inexorably bound together by virtue 
of the U.K.’s position as the preeminent destination for libel claimants.25 
Aided by Internet publication, U.K. courts have increasingly held that 
they have jurisdiction over defamation cases even where the source of 
the alleged libel action has limited publication in the U.K.26 The U.K.’s 
standard for jurisdiction, as articulated in Berezovsky v. Forbes,27 has 
three “distinctive features,” the most important being the definition of 
publication as “where the words are heard or read.”28 As a result,  
U.K. courts have now repeatedly held that, even where the 
defendant’s publication is distributed overwhelmingly in the U.S., 
so long as a few copies find their way into the U.K. or are 
 
 21. Id. art. 10 (original formatting omitted) (emphasis added).  
 22. PIETER VAN DIJK, ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 334–35 (4th ed., 2006).  
 23. Id. at 340.  
 24. Given that the focus of this paper is on the impact of fee-shifting on defamation cases, 
and not libel tourism, the summary and analysis of the libel tourism issues will be limited. The 
matter is exhaustive and ongoing, as is current scholarship surrounding it.  
 25. Robert Balin et al., Libel Tourism and the Duke’s Manservant, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 303, 304 (2009); 3 MLRC BULLETIN 99, 99 (2009).  
 26. Balin, supra note 25, at 305.  
 27. See Shuddup, Foreign Millionaires Like British Libel Laws. Publishers Don’t, THE 
ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2003), available at http://www.economist.com/node/1632864.  
 28. Berezovsky v. Michaels et al., [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (H.L.) 1012 (U.K., opinion of Lord 
Steyn).  
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downloaded by a few readers in England via the Internet, that is 
enough to constitute separate actionable publication in the U.K. and 
to subject the American defendant to the jurisdiction and venue of 
U.K. courts.
29
 
To protect U.S. journalists, bloggers, publishers, and others from 
becoming liable under the U.K.’s claimant-friendly substantive 
defamation law,30 in 2010, the United States passed the Securing the 
Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage 
(SPEECH) Act.31 The SPEECH Act requires that foreign defamation 
judgments shall not be enforced in the United States unless the plaintiff 
shows either that the foreign court provided at least as much free speech 
protection as would a U.S. court,32 or the plaintiff shows that the U.S. 
defendant would have been found liable of defamation in a U.S. court.33  
The protection provided by the SPEECH Act was necessary, and 
long overdue, but nonetheless incomplete in that it fails to protect U.S. 
citizens from the U.K.’s crippling fee structure. If a plaintiff with a U.K. 
judgment is able to meet the standards of a U.S. defamation claim, the 
result does not put the defendant in the same position she would have 
been in had the claim been brought in the United States. Rather, the 
English,34 not the American,35 fee-shifting rule would apply—requiring 
the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s fees, including their success fee and 
ATE insurance fees, even though the defendant would not have access 
to ATE insurance. This loophole in the SPEECH Act makes U.S. 
publishers (of all sizes) vulnerable in the U.K., and chills both what they 
say and to whom they say it. 
III.  ENGLISH RULE AND THE CURRENT CFA SYSTEM 
The “English Rule” for litigation damages, as compared to the 
“American Rule,” has traditionally been understood in the United States 
to require “the losing party in civil litigation to pay the winning party’s 
 
 29. Balin, supra note 25, at 305.  
 30. In the United States, a defamation plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with 
some level of fault, more than mere negligence and actual malice in the case of public figures and 
officials. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988). Furthermore, in the United States, the defamatory statement is 
presumed to be true and the plaintiff bears the burden to prove it false. Philadelphia Newspapers 
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). In the U.K., however, a defamation plaintiff proceeds under the 
presumption that the statement is false. Balin, supra note 25, at 304. The U.K. also differs in that 
the defendant, not the plaintiff, carries the burden to prove that the libelous statement was made 
with malice. Id. at 103–05.  
 31. 28 U.S.C. § 4101 [hereinafter SPEECH Act].  
 32. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(A).  
 33. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B).  
 34. Infra Part III(A).  
 35. Infra Part IV.  
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attorney’s fees.”36 In reality, in the U.K., the structure is far more 
complicated: the losing party looks forward to paying not only the 
winning party’s fees, but also court costs, and the insurance fees that the 
winning party had to pay to cover themselves in the event of loss. Add 
to this the insurance fee the losing side had to pay simply to protect 
themselves in the event they did lose, and the price tag for litigation in 
the U.K. looks less like the “no win, no fee” structure so often lauded,37 
and more like bankruptcy—and in the case of defamation suits, chilling 
of free speech. 
A.  CFAs, Success Fees, and After-the-Event Insurance 
As defined in the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, CFAs 
are designed to dictate the fee arrangement between a client and her 
attorney.38 When limited to this arrangement, CFAs do in fact establish 
a “no win, no fee” structure between the two parties—in the event that 
the client loses the case, or accepts a deal less favorable than that 
accepted by the opposing party, the lawyer will receive no fee from the 
client.39 The purpose behind this structure, according to the then Lord 
Chancellor who shepherded the legislation through the House of Lords 
in 1995, was to “extend access to justice” and “increase consumer 
choice.”40 The legislation recognized that most clients could not afford 
the hourly rates charged by even mediocre lawyers, and certainly not 
those charged by barristers, so the only way to ensure universal access 
to justice was to provide a combination of legal aid and a restructuring 
of the fee arrangements between clients and lawyers.  
The trouble was that lawyers were taking all of the risk. They 
could only take on so many clients under this agreement because if they 
had a string of losses, then those were man-hours they could never bill 
and money they could never get back. Particularly given the U.K. 
courts’ plaintiff-friendly approach to defamation cases, those clients 
already vulnerable to injustice (i.e., journalists and publishers), would 
be that much more vulnerable as they risked being systematically turned 
away by lawyers. Enter: success fees. 
Success fees were designed as an insurance policy for lawyers, to 
ensure that even if lawyers lost one case (and therefore walked away 
empty-handed), they would make up for it by taking up to an additional 
100% of their fees from the opposing party when they won the next 
case.41 Unfortunately, if the client loses the case, she is bound by the 
 
 36. Windon, supra note 18, at 182.  
 37. Bowcott, supra note 14.  
 38. Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, c. 41, § 58 (Eng.). 
 39. See Oxford Comparative Study, supra note 19, at 11.  
 40. Hollins v. Russell, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 2487 (H.L.) ¶ 4.  
 41. Oxford Comparative Study, supra note 19, at 11.  
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English Rule to cover her opponent’s costs of litigation as well.42 Of 
course, in the U.K., this is usually not just one but two representatives—
both a solicitor and a barrister. 
The final piece of the financial puzzle for litigating in U.K. courts 
is ATE insurance. Parties take out ATE insurance as protection to cover 
the winning party’s costs in the event the case is unsuccessful.43 As an 
Oxford study comparing the costs of defamation proceedings across 
Europe points out, the insurance is not mandatory.44 If an opposing party 
does not take out insurance, however, likely because they do not have 
the means to do so, then a potentially prevailing party faces the 
possibility of losing no matter what—the defendant and her lawyers 
would have amassed considerable legal and court costs defending a suit, 
but without any possibility of recovery of those costs; making it more 
economical to pay off the plaintiff or retract even a truthful statement 
than to defend the suit.45 
B.  Costs of the Current Fee Structure 
When considering the costs of the current fee structure, it is 
important to consider not only the pressure such a fee structure puts on 
“free speech” theoretically, but also to consider its specific applications 
and victims. Larger publishers, such as News Corp, the Telegraph 
Group, and the New York Times Media Group, are corporations who 
are less vulnerable to the theoretical implications of the costs entailed in 
the U.K.’s current fee structure. Therefore, it is easy to forget that there 
are real and practical free speech victims of CFAs and success fees. 
1.  Issues 
The U.K. courts have enunciated three major issues raised by the 
effect the current fee system has on the press around the country: (i) the 
ransom factor; (ii) the chilling effect; and, (iii) the blackmailing effect.46  
Justice Eady, in Turcu v. NGN, defined the first issue, the ransom 
factor, as the “significant temptation for media defendants to pay up 
something, to be rid of litigation for purely commercial reasons, and 
without regard to the true merits of any pleaded defence.”47 This effect 
was seen in stark relief in King v. Telegraph, where the claimant 
 
 42. Hollins, supra note 40, ¶ 27.  
 43. Oxford Comparative Study, supra note 19, at 11.  
 44. Id.  
 45. See King v. Telegraph Group, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2282 (H.L.) ¶¶ 36–37.  
 46. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, WRITTEN EVIDENCE 
SUBMITTED BY GUARDIAN NEWSPAPERS, 2005–06, H.C. § 6 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmconst/754/754we20.htm 
[hereinafter GUARDIAN EVIDENCE] for an outline of these three issues as raised by the courts.  
 47. Turcu v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd., [2005] EWHC 799 (QB) (Eng.).  
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brought a defamation suit against the Sunday Telegraph Newspaper for 
an article it ran claiming links between the claimant and Osama bin 
Laden. When Adam Musa King brought the claim, he did so through a 
CFA with his lawyers. He did not, however, take ATE insurance, 
forcing the newspaper to consider settling the matter, simply to hedge 
its bets against the potential cost associated with such a suit, despite the 
fact that they had a fairly sure shot at a “justification” defense.48 As 
Lord Hoffmann pointed out in the Campbell case, the effect of such an 
increase of costs is to force the speaker (newspaper, NGO, etc.) to settle 
instead of to “take such a stand.”49 
The second issue, the chilling effect, was also well examined in 
King. While the ransom effect is an after-the-fact effect, causing the 
newspaper defendant to give up fighting a suit already in play, for fear 
of having to pay more later than it could afford; the chilling effect, 
according to Lord Justice Brooke, is a before-the-fact self-imposed 
restraint that the newspaper would inevitably enforce to avoid 
disproportionate and unfair potential suits.50 The problem Lord Justice 
Brooke found was that potential costs to be levied against the defendant 
in the event they lose would fail to be “reasonable and proportionate” 
to those carried by the claimant.51 This threat of disproportionate and 
unreasonable fees would have the effect of silencing those who might 
otherwise speak out on issues of public interest. 
The final issue, the blackmailing effect, is an elaboration on the 
chilling and ransom effects.52 Noted by Lord Hoffman in the Campbell 
case, the blackmailing effect could be the result of the kind of ransom to 
which a defendant could be held, as in King, or could be the result of the 
“arms race” between parties’ solicitors to spend as much as the other, 
even if not necessary, to justify their cost position at the end of 
litigation.53 The impact of these two possibilities is essentially a game of 
“cost”-chicken between the two parties—with the more vulnerable party 
(the small newspaper or the middle-class claimant) more likely to jump 
out of the way first. 
 
 48. King, supra note 45, ¶ 40.  
 49. Campbell, supra note 5, ¶ 34.  
 50. King, supra note 45, ¶ 99.  
 51. Id. ¶ 101 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Jones v. Associated Newspapers, [2007] EWHC 
1489 (QB) (Eng.); Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 ¶ 49 (1995) 
(holding that an award of damages must bear a reasonable proportionality to the reputational 
harm suffered, which did not include a £1.5m fee for publishing an article in the Winchester 
College newsletter alleging that the Warden was guilty of war crimes).  
 52. GUARDIAN EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 6.3.  
 53. Campbell, supra note 5, ¶ 31. See also GUARDIAN EVIDENCE, supra note 46, ¶ 18 
(essentially defining “blackmailing effect” as synonymous with “random effect”).  
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2.  Victims 
Those whom the Lord Chancellor intended to protect turn out to be 
the very victims of this fee-shifting regime, despite the best intentions 
behind encouraging CFAs, success fees, and ATE insurance. As the 
intervenors in the Campbell case, and even those disputing the reforms 
proposed in LASPO, have pointed out, the high costs of defamation 
proceedings have a particular chilling effect on both smaller publishers 
and news organizations as well as NGOs.54 "NGOs and small 
publishers—including bloggers—are extremely vulnerable to the threat 
of a costly libel or privacy actions in the UK. They simply do not have 
the means to defend themselves, and are easily forced to apologize and 
retract allegations even when they know them to be true."55  
The first victims to examine are small publications around the 
U.K. As Lord Steyn pointed out in In Re S, when discussing the costs of 
litigation on the press, one is quick to think of “the press” as large 
media conglomerates with deep pockets that are likely to be able to 
afford such costs.56 One rarely thinks of the small local papers, which 
are in fact both the lifeblood of the country, and the most vulnerable to 
defamation suits.57 Citing The Newspaper Society, Lord Steyn pointed 
out that 85% of U.K. adults read a local paper, compared to 70% who 
read a national paper.58 A solicitor who frequently represented small 
papers around the country provided anecdotal evidence to Parliament in 
November 2005, showing just how damaging the chilling effect can be 
on local papers.59 This solicitor’s conclusion was that the financial risk 
of litigation in defamation claims drives smaller publishers to either 
self-censor out of fear of suit; to retract even when the statement was 
true and of public interest; or, to go bankrupt.60 
 
 54. Intervenors’ Comments, supra note 16, ¶ 2.  
 55. European Court Pulls Rug From Underneath Funding for Libel and Privacy Cases, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 18 2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/18/european-court-pulls-rug-underneath-funding-libel-and-
privacy-cases [hereinafter HRW, European Court Pulls Rug].  
 56. In Re S (a child), [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 A.C. 593 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED 
BY TONY JAFFA, PARTNER, FOOT ANSTEY SOLICITORS, 2005–06, H.C. 3 (U.K.).  
 60. Id. ¶ 18. One particular case Mr. Jaffa recalls is that of a small weekly paper, which 
published a Letter to the Editor criticizing the District Council. The Council threatened to sue, 
and even though the paper was protected by the Fair Comment defense, the editor recognized the 
steep financial battle he faced when he discovered that the council had retained a lawyer under a 
CFA. To avoid the potential financial burden, the editor decided to publicly apologize and pay a 
settlement. Such was the ransom effect of the CFA on this local paper. The chilling effect, Mr. 
Jaffa hypothesized, was that it would be a very long time before that local paper would ever again 
be willing to criticize the Council. Id.  ¶¶ 15–17. Such self-censorship is at the heart of the free-
speech battle over fee-shifting, particularly in the realm of the almost insupportable “search for 
truth” argument for free speech. Supporting free-speech because it allows journalists to find “the 
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The other victims to consider are NGOs. NGOs are not just 
publishers in their own right, providing their own analysis and news 
coverage of issues around the world almost exclusively on the internet.61 
They have also become important resources for news organizations 
whose own news gathering departments are shrinking.62 Of particular 
concern to NGOs, much more so than to small publishers, is the impact 
of libel tourism on their exposure to crushing legal fees in U.K. 
defamation cases.63 Whereas small, local publishers outside of the U.K. 
will have little cause for writing about potential claimants outside of 
their locale, U.S. based NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, frequently 
and necessarily expose themselves to potential international claimants 
with diverse interests who could establish jurisdiction in the U.K.64  
C.  Benefits of the Current Fee Structure 
Despite the overwhelming pressure the current fee structure places 
on free speech, it is important to keep in mind the policy reasons behind 
its initial design and those it does protect. The purpose of the CFAs and 
success fees, as mentioned above, was to provide access to the courts, 
both for defendants and plaintiffs.65 Unlike U.K. CFAs, U.S. 
contingency fees do not provide success fees as an incentive to take 
more clients on contingency. As a result, a U.S. defense attorney might 
 
truth” is a highly limiting doctrine for the liberty, as a whole; however, in the few cases where it 
is applicable, as here, it provides exponentially more weight to the freedom than any other 
argument. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS LIMITS 8–16 (1999) 
(explaining the “search for truth” doctrine).  
 61. ANDREW CURRAH, WHAT’S HAPPENING TO OUR NEWS: AN INVESTIGATION IN THE 
LIKELY IMPACT OF THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION ON THE ECONOMICS OF NEWS PUBLISHING IN THE 
UK 106 (Oxford’s Reuters Inst. for the Study of Journalism ed. 2009) (discussing the reliance of 
news organizations on PR firms furthering their clients’ agenda, including charities and NGOs).  
 62. Id.; see also Intervenors' Comments, supra note 16, ¶ 6.  
 63. See HRW, European Court Pulls Rug, supra note 55; see Intervenors Comments, supra 
note 16, ¶ 9 for comments by Dinah PoKempner, the general counsel for Human Rights Watch, 
pointing out that libel tourism is “the greatest legal risk we run.”  
 64. See, e.g., Nguesso v. Global Witness, [2007] EWHC 1980 (QB) (Eng.) (where the NGO 
in fact won a defamation dispute brought in the U.K. by the son of the President of the Congo 
because of his business holdings there, for claims of corruption, but were never able to receive the 
damages due, let alone their success fee, even though they could have been out £100,000 had they 
lost); Intervenors’ Comments, supra note 16, ¶ 10 (Human Rights Watch had to pay tens of 
thousands of dollars to settle a defamation claim by the subject of a report on Rwandan genocide, 
six years after its publication, because the U.K. government had partially relied on the report in 
denying the claimant naturalization); id. ¶¶ 14–15 (Index on Censorships abandoned a story about 
libel tourism when it was threatened with a defamation suit by a potential subject of the piece); 
Nicholas Always, Costs and the Scourge of Conditional Fee Agreements, PRESS GAZETTE (Mar. 
1 2002), available at http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=27856 (even though a 
straightforward Offer of Amends, including a cash settlement and a public apology for 
accidentally posting a photo of a family’s house and mislabeling it as connected to a recently 
uncovered child prostitution ring, had been made, the claimant’s solicitors still insisted that a 35% 
success fee was reasonable for the case—and the court agreed).  
 65. Hollins, supra note 40, ¶ 4.  
10/16/2013 10:58 AM   
444 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 35:433 
 
infrequently accept a client on a contingency fee because there is no 
added incentive or protection for doing so.66 This is not so in the U.K. 
U.K. success fees and ATEs make sure that the U.K. attorney gets paid, 
and then some, if she is successful in balancing out the risk of taking 
clients who might lose at other times.67 
IV.  AMERICAN RULE AND THE ANTI-SLAPP AMENDMENTS 
Courts in U.S. litigation follow the American Rule for fee shifting, 
with notable exceptions.68 The American Rule requires that courts 
“refus[e] to award damages to a victorious party unless otherwise 
provided for by statute.”69 The policy behind the American Rule is to 
ensure that the courts remain open to all, that individuals seek legal 
redress for perceived wrongs,70 and that parties are not intimidated into 
settlement or abstinence by the threat of taking on the costs of the other 
party’s case; all while discouraging frivolous lawsuits.71 Furthermore, it 
has been suggested that fee-shifting, and its “guarantee” of payment, 
might encourage lawyers to perform unnecessary legal services and 
charge more for them—an extravagance the courts are keen to avoid.72 
Exceptions to this general rule are specifically carved out by federal73 or 
state74 statute, and are generally not left to the discretion of the courts.75 
This is in direct contrast with the “English Rule,” which, as discussed 
above, has allowed fee shifting at the discretion of the courts for 
centuries.76  
In the United States, although there is federal statutory law 
allowing for fee shifting in privacy claims against the government,77 
there is no federal statutory law providing for fee shifting in private 
defamation cases. In fact, at the state level, the most comprehensive 
protection a potential defendant has against frivolous defamation claims 
 
 66. See infra Part IV. Cf. Windon, supra note 18, at 182 (providing that there is a prevalence 
of attorneys working on contingency in the United States, and that as much as 86% percent of 
libel claimants are represented on a contingency basis).  
 67. Jones v. Associated Newspapers, [2007] EWHC 1489 (QB) (Eng.) at 31.  
 68. See Arcambel v. Wisman, 3 U.S. 306, 306 (1796).  
 69. Windon, supra note 18, at 181.  
 70. Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the Online 
Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 183 (2008).  
 71. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 264 (1975).  
 72. Ciolli, supra note 70, at 182.  
 73. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 a(g)(2)(B) & (g)(3)(B) (providing for the shifting of fees to 
the government in the event of a successful claim against the government of a violation of the 
Privacy Act).  
 74. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010) (providing “reasonable attorney’s fees” 
to the defendant in the event a SLAPP plaintiff is unable to establish, with convincing clarity, the 
required elements of their case).  
 75. Alyeska Pipeline Svc. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 266–70 (1975).  
 76. Id. at 247.  
 77. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (West 2009).  
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is Anti-SLAPP statutes. Although a federal Anti-SLAPP provision was 
proposed in Congress in 2009, there is currently no federally enacted 
provision;78 however, there is almost national coverage as the result of 
state statutory law.79 In the majority of these statutes, there is a fee-
shifting provision built in, as a means by which to ward off frivolous 
SLAPP suits, including defamation suits.80 
A.  Anti-SLAPP Legislation 
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) claims are 
suits brought “in response to an individual’s or a group’s exercise of the 
right to speak out on a public issue.”81 The purpose behind the suit is not 
to win, or to achieve a financial objective, but to silence, or chill, the 
speech of the defendant.82 This is not surprising, given that defamation 
claims are usually brought for non-economic reasons: either the plaintiff 
is a large organization trying to deter criticism by bringing serial suits, 
or an individual who is hurt and angry.83 Although SLAPP suits can 
come in many flavors (e.g., malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress), defamation claims are one 
of the most common causes of action.84   
The issues raised by SLAPP claims are very similar to the issues 
raised by the current U.K. fee-shifting structure, and therefore make it 
an appropriate legislative comparison. As was found in the U.K., the 
 
 78. Citizens Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009). See also United 
States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding by the Ninth Circuit that it has federal jurisdiction to hear cases regarding California’s 
anti-SLAPP state law); cf. Stuborn Ltd. Partnership v. Bernstein, 245 F.Supp.2d 312, 316 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (holding by the First Circuit that anti-SLAPP issues are strictly procedural and in 
conflict with federal law, therefore outside the jurisdiction of federal court).  
 79. Anti-SLAPP statutes have been passed in Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, 
Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Minnesota, Missouri, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Illinois, Indiana, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Maine, Vermont, Rhode Island, New 
York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Hawaii. Public 
Participation Project: Fighting for Free Speech, STATE ANTI-SLAPP LAWS (2013), available at 
http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/#C [hereinafter Public Participation 
Project].  
 80. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 425.16(c)(1) (West 2009) (providing attorney’s fees 
and costs for defendants, but only “reasonable” attorney’s fees and costs for plaintiffs who can 
establish the viability of her case); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a(a) (McKinney 2008) (providing 
attorney fees to SLAPP defendant if she can prove that the claim was “without substantial basis in 
fact and law”).  
 81. Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-Slapp Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary 
on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 803–04 (2000).  
 82. Ciolli, supra note 70, at 192.  
 83. Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel: An Empirical Assessment, in THE 
COST OF LIBEL: ECON. AND POL'Y IMPLICATIONS 21, 22 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam 
eds., 1989). See also David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The Problem 
and Possible Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1208–09 (1995).  
 84. Tate, supra note 81, at 804–05.  
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principle concern of defamation SLAPP suits in particular is their 
chilling effect on speech.85 Anti-SLAPP statutes were therefore 
designed specifically to prevent such an effect “through abuse of the 
judicial process.”86 Prior provisions to deal with SLAPP suits included 
substantive defenses, as well as summary judgments, and SLAPP-back 
suits.87 The key failures of all of these solutions are two-fold: (1) that 
they still require a defendant to spend the time, energy, and money on 
defending the suit in court, no matter how bogus it is; and, (2) there is 
no way to make the defendant whole again once she proves the claim 
was baseless. States began enacting legislation that would provide 
protection for defendants against these bogus suits by limiting the 
amount of actual litigation required to disprove the claim (thereby 
reducing costs), as well as providing a fee-shifting provision to make 
the victims of these suits whole.88 
B.  Case Study: California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute 
In 1993, California’s was one of the first Anti-SLAPP statutes 
enacted in the United States,89 and is a model used around the country.90 
The key difference between the California statute and others, however, 
is its application beyond the right to petition, therefore broadening its 
application to personal, not necessarily governmental, matters.91 This 
factor makes the California statute particularly relevant for 
consideration in contrast to the U.K. fee-shifting provisions in 
defamation cases. It is valuable to consider both the mechanics of the 
statute as well as the legislative policies behind it.  
The statute itself includes the policy reasons behind its original 
enactment92—a move that proved to be important twenty years later 
when it became necessary to amend the legislation to remain in line 
with these considerations.93 The statute is found in three parts: § 425.16 
 
 85. See Stephen M. Renas, et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect: Are 
Newspapers Affected by Liability Standards in Defamation Actions?, in THE COST OF LIBEL: 
ECON. AND POL'Y IMPLICATIONS 41 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989) (explaining 
the chilling effect of defamation claims on editors and publishers, even in a post-Sullivan world); 
See Chris Dent & Andrew T. Kenyon, Defamation Law’s Chilling Effect: A Comparative Content 
Analysis of Australian and US Newspapers, 9 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 89, 107–09 (2004) 
(providing substantial evidence to show that Australian coverage of government corruption is 
under-reported compared to the United States, where the defamation law is more “defendant” 
friendly due to the Constitutional privileges allowed in Sullivan and Falwell).  
 86. Tate, supra note 81, at 801 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2000)).  
 87. Id. at 805.  
 88. Id.  
 89. See Public Participation Project, supra note 79.  
 90. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a (McKinney 2008).  
 91. Tate, supra note 81, at 812–14.  
 92. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 1994); see also Tate, supra note 81, at 806.  
 93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(a) (West 2012).  
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covers the protections provided and remedies for both SLAPPers and 
SLAPPees; § 425.17 provides the recently added limitations on § 
425.16;94 and, § 425.18 delineates provisions for SLAPP-back suits 
from those of malicious prosecutions.95 
Section 425.16 begins by clarifying that the purpose of enacting 
the statute was to counteract the “disturbing increase in lawsuits brought 
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of 
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.”96 It then 
proceeds to outline the mechanics of the statute. First, when a claim is 
brought against someone exercising their right to free speech, under the 
U.S. or California constitutions, the statute provides for a special motion 
to strike based on the limited material already available to the court (i.e., 
pleadings, defenses, etc.), unless the plaintiff can show that she would 
likely prevail in the suit.97 If the defendant prevails in the motion to 
strike, then the plaintiff must pay defendant’s attorney fees and costs.98 
If the court holds that the motion to strike was frivolous, and finds for 
the plaintiff, then the defendant must pay the plaintiff’s “reasonable” 
attorney’s fees and costs—a qualification not provided regarding 
payment of defendant’s fees and costs.99  
In 2011, the California legislature introduced amendments in 
reaction to abuses of the statute that had resulted in the chilling of real 
grievances in the public interest.100 Section 425.17 delineates when a § 
425.16 motion to strike will not be available to a defendant.101 The 
statute now excludes statements or actions made as representations to 
potential customers regarding goods or services.102 The statute also 
requires a set of factors a defendant must meet to bring a motion to 
strike.103 Pointedly, however, the statute excludes journalists, authors, 
artists, and any non-profits at least 50% dependent on government 
support, from those limitations of the amendment.104 
 
 94. Id. (in response to the chilling effect of §425.16 on real grievance brought in the public 
interest).  
 95. Given that the focus of this paper is on defamation suits and not malicious prosecutions, 
it will not include an analysis of the further SLAPP-back provisions of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 
425.18.  
 96. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 1994).  
 97. Id. §§ 425.16(b)(1) & (b)(2).  
 98. Id. § 425.16(c)(1) (further providing that in limited circumstances, defendants cannot 
receive fees and costs, including if they are already receiving fees and costs pursuant to another 
section, or if the claim was brought by the state or other government official).  
 99. Id.  
 100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(a) (West 2012).  
 101.   Id. § 425.17(b)(1).  
 102. Id. § 425.17(c).  
 103. Id. § 425.17(b).  
 104. Id. § 425.17(d).  
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V.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
Due to libel tourism, any solution to the chilling effect of the 
current CFA system in the U.K. will have considerable repercussions 
for libel suits in the United States. The SPEECH Act limits a plaintiff’s 
ability to enforce U.K. libel decisions to those that would meet the 
burden of proof in the United States,105 but if the decision is enforceable, 
U.S. defendants will be susceptible to whatever the cost burden would 
be as an extension of that judgment. Given the prevalence of Internet 
“publication” over all other kinds of dissemination of thought, this is a 
very real consideration. Thus, any solution must not only balance 
Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR,106 but also meet the goals of U.S. 
defamation law:107 providing protection beyond the Constitutional 
privileges,108 and other defenses provided by substantive common law. 
A.  The “English” Rule 
For some American scholars, the “English” Rule is one proposed 
solution for the imbalance in the U.K.109 The English Rule requires the 
losing party to cover the winning party’s costs and fees, and, absent 
success fees, is arguably sufficient to provide both parties in a 
defamation claim access to justice.110 Similarly, the ECtHR in Campbell 
seemed untroubled by CFAs and fee-shifting per se, and held only the 
success fees to be the cause of the “blackmailing,” “chilling,” and 
“ransom” effects highlighted by Lord Hoffman in his earlier opinion on 
the case.111 But would fee shifting absent the success fees allow 
attorneys to provide the same level of representation to the same variety 
of clients? In other words, would attorneys still be able to provide CFAs 
to clients as frequently as they do now, and therefore keep the doors of 
justice open? Furthermore, as Professor Boies points out, there is no 
knowing how a judge and jury are going to rule; as confident as a party 
may be, such that the “protection” provided by the English Rule would 
be an incentive instead of a deterrent, a party could still find herself 
surprisingly liable for hers and her opponents’ costs.112  
 
 105. SPEECH Act, supra note 31, at § 4102(a)(1).  
 106. ECHR, supra note 20, arts. 8, 10.  
 107. Windon, supra note 18, at 177–78.  
 108. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  
 109. See David A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. 
REV. 847, 851 (1986) (“Fee-shifting provides the dual benefits of making deserving plaintiffs 
whole and discouraging frivolous suits.”). See also Boies, supra note 83, at 1212.  
 110. Id.  
 111. MGN, supra note 2, ¶ 209.  
 112. Boies, supra note 83, at 1213 (also providing a solution for the problem: only provide 
fee-shifting to the defendant, thus limiting the potential chilling of free speech, but failing to 
protect the bona fide plaintiff).  
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B.  “Modified” Fee-Shifting 
Another potential solution would be for “modified” fee shifting, as 
suggested by Professor Bradley Saxton.113 He proposes that the losing 
party pay the winning party’s fees, unless the winning party is only 
successful by virtue of a qualified privilege.114 This approach would 
ensure that the defendant would still have to cover her own expenses 
were her statement in fact both false and defamatory, regardless of the 
status of the plaintiff, and therefore falls short of the ECtHR’s goal of 
lifting the chilling effect of fee shifting. 
C.  Anti-SLAPP Legislation: California 
A final potential solution could be to follow California’s Anti-
SLAPP model.115 This model provides defendants an opportunity to 
show that a defamation claim is bogus (i.e., usually merely an effort to 
intimidate a writer or publisher from publishing the truth) before 
spending extortionate fees on litigation, and to be made whole again if 
successful. Meanwhile, the plaintiff retains the opportunity to prove that 
the claim was in fact well-founded, so as to keep the doors of justice 
open to her.  
Despite its strengths, were the California Anti-SLAPP model 
introduced in the U.K., it could still fail to help victims of libel tourism. 
Although such a model is effective when the defense is simple (e.g., 
immunity for Internet intermediaries under § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act), for more complex cases, a defendant 
would effectively have to try the case early—unprepared and even more 
vulnerable to liability. Furthermore, foreign libel defendants often 
default as they lack the means to travel to the U.K. and establish a 
defense.116  
The very basic, preliminary showing provided for by Anti-SLAPP, 
however, is specifically designed to keep costs down, therefore making 
 
 113. Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problems of 
“Overdeterrence” and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 45, 100 (1995) 
(proposing a modified fee-shifting arrangement to protect against the chilling effect of potential 
suits regarding employer references).  
 114. Id.  
 115. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 1994). See Ciolli, supra note 70, 192–94 
(suggesting such a model to remedy the chilling effects of § 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act of 1996).  
 116. See, e.g., David Pallister, US Author Mounts ‘Libel Tourism’ Challenge, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15 2007), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/15/books.usa (Rachel Ehrefeld defaulted on a 
defamation claim in U.K. court in 2006 by über-litigious Sheik Khalid bin Mahfouz for her book, 
Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed – and How to Stop It, where she alleged that Mahfouz 
financed terrorism. Ehrefeld took her case to the U.S. federal courts, and eventually prompted not 
just New York legislation to fight libel tourism, but also the SPEECH Act itself.).  
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it more likely than any other proposed solution to provide protection to 
victims of libel tourism. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
LASPO’s revisions of CFAs in privacy suits fall short of the goals 
of the ECtHR and, by extension, the British Parliament. They fail to 
appeal to the majority of Britons increasingly aware of the vulnerability 
of their privacy thanks to the firestorm over media practices driven by 
the Levenson enquiry. The Levenson enquiry uncovered the depths of 
the unethical steps journalists and editors took over the last few years to 
get to the latest hot story, causing Parliament to declare Rupert 
Murdoch to be “not a fit person” to lead an international company.117 
Yet, LASPO also fails to effectively protect free speech rights. 
LASPO limits success fees to a percentage of the damages 
awarded to the prevailing party, and eliminates ATE insurance for 
privacy claims.118 In a country where lawyers’ fees are twice those in the 
United States, due to the requirement of having a barrister and solicitor, 
doing away with ATE insurance is LASPO’s first mistake. The 
insurance is a minimal contributor to the overall cost of suit and is one 
of the few safeguards against the chilling effects of potential 
bankruptcy. 
Instead, Parliament should overhaul the fee shifting structure 
altogether, and in its place, follow California’s Anti-SLAPP model. It 
would lift the chill caused by the current structure, while allowing 
plaintiffs the opportunity to establish the validity of their claim. 
Furthermore the fee shifting provided by such an approach should be 
accompanied by a requirement for ATE insurance. Together, these 
would be sufficient to incentivize attorneys to represent parties on both 
sides.  
For such a structure to work, however, the issues of fact and law 
would have to be straightforward enough for the court to be able to 
make a ruling based on the limited information provided in the 
pleadings and defenses. Currently, respondents in U.K. defamation 
cases carry the burden of proving the truth of defamatory statements.119 
This creates a Sisyphean task for defendants, and is why U.K. courts are 
 
 117. Dan Sabbagh & Josh Halliday, Rupert Murdoch Deemed ‘Not a Fit Person’ to Run 
International Company, THE GUARDIAN (May 1, 2012), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/may/01/rupert-murdoch-not-fit-phone-
hacking?INTCMP=SRCH.  
 118. Legal Aid, supra note 8, cls. 44, 46.  
 119. The changes affected by this year’s Defamation Act have made great strides towards 
strengthening speech rights in the U.K., and by extension, around the world. The Act, however, 
failed to alter this key burden-shifting element. See generally Defamation Act, 2013, c. 26 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/pdfs/ukpga_20130026_en.pdf.  
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the libel tourism capital of the world. Sadly, until the U.K. courts are 
prepared to adjust the burden of proof in defamation law, the necessary 
clarity will not be available, and such a fee structure will not be 
possible. 
 
 
